​As of mid-April 2025, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has finalized and refined its Section 301 maritime policy, significantly altering the landscape for vessels linked to China. The updated regulations, set to take effect on October 14, 2025, now impose higher fees on vessels owned or operated by Chinese entities compared to those merely constructed in Chinese shipyards.​

The United States’ latest port fee regime, announced by the USTR and set to take effect in October 2025, signals a shift in the role of America’s ports. Traditionally passive nodes within global trade networks, ports are now being repositioned as active instruments of industrial policy—supporting a broader strategy to rebuild national production ecosystems from the coastline inward.

At the heart of the new measures is an effort to leverage the United States’ status as a major end market to influence upstream supply chains. By adjusting cost structures for Chinese-built vessels servicing U.S. ports—while offering incentives for companies investing in U.S.-built ships—the policy aims to rebalance not only manufacturing but also maritime logistics capacity toward domestic shores.

This approach reflects a broader focus on securing critical supply nodes—ships, shipyards, and port infrastructure—alongside the goods they move. Exemptions for domestic routes and certain energy cargoes, such as LNG, suggest a nuanced strategy: maintaining key strategic exports while gradually reshaping inbound logistics. The phased requirements for LNG shippers to incorporate U.S.-built tonnage over time further hint at a long-term industrial development agenda designed to avoid immediate market disruption.

Viewed through this lens, the measures are less about targeting any single country and more about reinforcing the architecture of the U.S. supply chain. China’s dominance in global shipping merely underscores the vulnerabilities Washington seeks to address.

In an evolving global economy where supply chain security increasingly rivals pure cost considerations, this strategy marks a significant—if gradual—evolution: ports, ships, and shipyards are being reimagined not merely as commercial infrastructure, but as strategic national assets.

The timing of this policy coincides with rising attention to shipbuilding cooperation between the United States and South Korea. As highlighted in the Korea JoongAng Daily, Korean and American officials are exploring a deeper shipbuilding partnership, recognising the strategic vulnerabilities created by China’s dominance, currently accounting for over 50% of global ship construction. The discussions during recent trade talks emphasised collaborative frameworks to bolster shipyard capacity, innovation in green ship technologies, and mutual resilience against market distortions fuelled by Chinese state subsidies.

While many U.S. labor groups and shipbuilding advocates welcome the port fee initiative, critics argue that it could contravene World Trade Organisation rules and provoke retaliatory actions from China. Nevertheless, Washington appears committed to fortifying its maritime infrastructure, with a public hearing scheduled for May 19 to review further proposals, including tariffs on ship-to-shore cranes and related port equipment—a critical sector also heavily reliant on Chinese manufacturing.

Overview of Current Exposure

In 2024, U.S. ports recorded 20,218 tanker port calls, of which 3,158 were made by Chinese-built tankers, representing approximately 15.62% of all tanker port activity. This means roughly one in every six tanker calls involved a vessel built in China.

Detailed Segment Exposure

Breaking down the reliance on Chinese-built tankers reveals notable differences across vessel classes. MR1 tankers exhibit particularly high exposure, with approximately 20% of all MR1 calls made by Chinese-built ships. The VLCC segment shows even greater proportional dependence, with about 24% of port calls involving Chinese-built vessels. Although MR2 tankers account for the highest number of overall calls, only around 10% involve Chinese-built units, suggesting a lower relative risk. The MR1 and MR2 classes are essential to U.S. refined product flows — both for Gulf Coast exports and domestic imports. Any disruptions affecting MR tanker availability would likely trigger sharp increases in Atlantic Basin freight rates, directly impacting gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel markets. Aframax and Suezmax segments also show significant, but more moderate, exposures of roughly 18% and 14%, respectively. This distribution highlights a critical distinction: while MR2 tankers dominate in call volume, MR1 and VLCC vessels carry proportionally higher regulatory risk if targeted actions or tariffs are imposed on Chinese-built ships. For larger crude movements, the VLCC and Suezmax segments, despite lower call volumes, face meaningful proportional exposure. VLCCs, pivotal for U.S. crude exports from hubs like Corpus Christi and LOOP, could see operational bottlenecks, tightening global supplies of medium and heavy crude grades, and introducing new volatility into international oil markets.

Anticipating potential U.S. regulatory actions, both tanker owners and charterers must adapt their strategies. Owners should prioritise diversifying their fleets by securing access to non-Chinese-built vessels for U.S. trades. Charterers will need to strengthen vetting protocols to ensure compliance with emerging trade measures.

Additionally, close monitoring of the insurance market will be vital: rising premiums for Chinese-built tonnage could materially shift voyage economics. Over time, these dynamics may reshape investment strategies, steering newbuild orders toward Korean and Japanese yards and gradually reducing the global fleet’s reliance on Chinese construction.

USTR Tariff Impacts on Chinese Tanker Fleets (2025)

The U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) projected 2025 fee regime introduces a clear bifurcation between Chinese-built and Chinese-owned tankers calling at U.S. ports, marking a significant escalation in maritime trade tensions between the U.S. and China. The updated fee structure, derived from 2024 port call activity, is expected to raise operating costs sharply for Chinese maritime interests.

Fee Disparity Intensifies Strategic Pressure

The newly introduced port fee regime places heavy additional costs on Chinese-owned tankers, while continuing to exempt Chinese-built ships. Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) owned by Chinese entities will see their cumulative port exposure rise sharply from $365.7 million to $456.8 million. Similarly, Aframax tankers will see fees climb from $350.78 million to $438.48 million, while Suezmax tankers will face an increase from $261.9 million to $327.4 million. These adjustments—representing up to a 25% fee hike—position Chinese shipowners at a marked competitive disadvantage relative to global peers, particularly in the high-volume crude oil transport segment where cost efficiency is critical.

Smaller Tanker Classes No Longer Exempt

The reclassification of fee exemptions dramatically extends the policy’s reach. Previously exempt classes such as Panamax, MR2, and MR1 vessels are now subject to newly established flat fees under the Chinese-owned framework. For MR2 vessels alone, the additional financial burden is projected at $118.8 million. This shift is particularly disruptive to operators engaged in short-haul refined product trades, where thinner margins make cost increases more difficult to absorb. The cumulative impact will likely force adjustments in voyage economics and could accelerate fleet redeployment or asset sales among Chinese owners.

Strategic Implications for Fleet Deployment

Facing steepened U.S. operational costs, Chinese shipowners may find it economically prudent to reassign vessels away from U.S. Gulf Coast terminals. Instead, fleets may be redirected toward the Asia-Pacific or Middle Eastern markets, where fee structures and geopolitical risks are relatively lower. In the near term, this could tighten tanker supply in the Gulf Coast region, driving freight rates higher for both crude oil and refined products. Refiners, especially those heavily reliant on seaborne crude imports, may see narrower refining margins as transport costs escalate.

Market Distortion Risks

The dual system—targeting Chinese ownership while exempting construction origin—creates an uneven playing field. In response, charterers and brokers may increasingly favour Chinese-built vessels owned by non-Chinese companies, pushing commercial preferences away from Chinese-controlled fleets. This evolving dynamic risks depressing the market valuations of Chinese-owned assets. To counteract these pressures, Chinese stakeholders may increasingly utilise leasing arms or engage in shadow ownership arrangements, making ultimate ownership structures more opaque and complicating regulatory enforcement efforts.

Broader Trade War Escalation

Beyond commercial and operational impacts, this policy serves as a broader escalation signal in the U.S.–China trade conflict. By focusing sanctions and regulatory measures on ownership nationality, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) reinforces Washington’s ongoing strategy of strategic decoupling. This aligns maritime policy more closely with national security concerns and suggests that corporate nationality, not merely trade behaviour, will increasingly be treated as a determinant of market access and regulatory burden.

Conclusion

The 2025 USTR fee framework underscores a decisive regulatory shift that penalises Chinese ownership in maritime shipping. As the financial gap between Chinese-built and Chinese-owned vessels widens, stakeholders will need to reassess trade patterns, fleet strategies, and asset deployment models. This policy may accelerate fragmentation in global shipping networks and deepen the decoupling trend across strategic maritime supply chains.

Source: By Maria Bertzeletou, Signal Group, https://go.thesignalgroup.com/e/9…-iIVh8OORCkqtFn9cHY